#38th parallel trial
#38th parallel free

(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001).Libretto, staging, video: Aleksi Barrière Johnson, “Effects of Groupthink on Tactical Decision-Making,” A Monograph. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America 1945–1955 (New York: Alfred A.

#38th parallel free

Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950–1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 169.Įric F. Tomlinson, “Decision Making and the Invasion at Inchon,” file:///Users/ccuser/Desktop/Decision%20Making%20and%20the%20Invasion%20 at%20Ichon.html#ChristenTomlinson96_12.ĭean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 442.ĭean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Kin, Tail of the Paper Tiger (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1961), 331.īarton Bernstein, “The Truman Administration and the Korean War,” in The Truman Presidency, ed. William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 153. Muccio, “Military Aid to Korean Security Forces,” Department of State Bulletin, XXII (June 26, 1950), 1. Matray, “Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eight Parallel Decision in Korea,” in The Journal of American History, vol.

Donovan, Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia (New York: St. Truman (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973), 268. Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Buhite, “Major Interests: American Policy toward China, Taiwan and Korea, 1945 –1950,” in Pacific Historical Review, vol. Ronald McGlothlen, “Acheson, Economics, and the American Commitment in Korea, 1947 –1950,” in Pacific Historical Review, vol.

#38th parallel trial

2: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 267. Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War (New York: Enigma Books, 1999), 4. As Suny notes, the Soviet ambassador in Washington had also sent his own “long telegram” to Moscow in which he states that the United States was striving for “world dominance.”ĭennis D. See Ronald Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 352 –3. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24–30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 276. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors.

On July 27, 1953, the parties involved in the conflict signed an armistice agreement. Despite being forewarned by China that it would not tolerate such an act, Truman authorized MacArthur and his forces to march into North Korea. After the UN forces pushed the North Korean troops to retreat to their homeland, Truman faced a second critical decision: Whether to allow MacArthur’s forces to cross the 38th parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under a regime friendly to the United States. His decision to help led to the implementation of a UN military counterattack under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. Shortly after the invasion, Truman had to decide whether to assist South Korea militarily. It compelled the president to make two distinct decisions. A crisis decision involves “a response to a high threat to values, either immediate or long range, where there is little time for decision under conditions of surprise.” 1 North Korea’s surprise decision in June 1950 to cross the 38th parallel dividing it from South Korea placed the administration of Harry Truman in a crisis mode.